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WHICH ACTIVATION FUNCTION OF COOPERATION DESCRIBES 
HUMAN BEHAVIOR? 
Properties of cooperation's probability function in Prisoner`s Dilemma 
have impact on evolution of game. Basic model defines that probability 
of cooperation depends linearly, both on the player's altruism and the 
co-player's reputation. I propose modification of activation function to 
smooth one (hyperbolic tangent with scaling parameter a, which 
corresponds to its shape) and observe three phases for different range 
of a. (1) For small a, strategies seem to randomly change in time and 
situation of mixed choices (one cooperates and second defects) 
dominate. (2) For medium a, players choose only one strategy for given 
period of time (the common state can switch to opposite one with some 
probability). (3) For large a, mixed strategy (once defect, once 
cooperate) is coexisting with common strategies and no change is 
allowed. I believe that proposed function characterizes better socio-
economical phenomena and especially phases 1 and 2 contain most of 
human behavior. 
Introduction.  
Optimization problems are well studied in computer science and 
mathematics and individual human decision can be understood this way [1]. 
Various methods have been proposed to forecast individual decision 
including Markov chain models, machine learning, neural networks, Bayesian 
networks, celluar automaton, but mainly game theory. In a world of social 
studies modeling in genaral is getting more and more popular. Ability to find 
patterns in sequences of human decisions is an important component of 
Artificial Intelligence. Laboratory studies, society observations and computer 
simulations show that successful pattern-recognition is limited by bounded 
rationality (so uncertainty must be included in the model). The classical Game 
Theory model describes optimal strategy known as stable states or Nash 
equilibrium of cooperation and defect in a single game. Unfortunately, if 
game is repeated and players have memory and can adopt their strategy, the 
optimal strategy is to defect. This is happening with loss to society. However 
sociological studies provide much more variety in human behavior. In order 
to imitate society, a simple, no-parameter model of the Evolutionary Prisoner 
Dilemma was previously proposed [2] and developend in [3]. However, 
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limiting only to winning strategies (as vet for vet with vartiation 
allowing to forgive) in sense of Axelrod Tournament [4], do not reflect 
all of the observed real situations. Human societies, are organized 
around altruistic, cooperative interactions [5], while the same time 
achieving a cooperative solution is very difficult if there is a change for 
exploitation others players or state [6].  
Cooperate or defect: these questions can be answered according to 
some mathematical rules. The setting is described by players acquiring 
reputation and altruism, which in turn determine their choice of strategy. 
The probability of cooperation depends, both on the player’s altruism 
and the co-player’s reputation. Agents can establish the best strategy in 
repeated games. Each time a player cooperates, his reputation goes up 
(vice versa in case of defection). Two key factors [7] are named in 
human decision making process (estimates of how important each of 
those factors are very subjective): the normative (Homo Sociologicus) 
and the rational one (Homo Economicus). I focus on sociological 
(normative) perspective, there collective behavior is observed. This 
paper proposes a modification of the activation function used for 
defining the probability of cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma (game 
theory). By changing the parameter a of the activation function, 
different behaviours can be simulated. 
Each agent i is endowed with two parameters: altruism εi and 
reputation Wi. Initial values of the parameters are selected randomly 
from homogeneous distributions: ρ(εi) is unitary for -0.5<εi<0.5, 
otherwise ρ(εi)=0, and ρ(Wi)  is unitary for 0<Wi<1, otherwise ρ(Wi)=0.  
Each time a player cooperates, his reputation goes up (vice versa 
in case of defection) but altruism is constant. If agents play in pairs, they 
choose both only one strategy in almost all cases. The probability that i 
cooperates with j is given by )()(=),( xF
j
W
i
FjiP  . Reputation 
change dynamic rules are defined by: if j cooperated, her/his reputation 
transformed as )/2(1 ii WW  , otherwise /2ii WW  . 
Various activation functions could be used: 
- standard case 0=)(xF  if 0<x , xxF =)(  if 1<<0 x  and 
1=)(xF  if 1>x   
-  normalized to probability case 0.5)/2(=)(  ji WxF    
-  our smooth function (1=),( axF tanh 1/2)))/2((  ji Wa  , 
where a is scaling parameter.   
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Fig.  1. Visualization of different variants of cooperation probability 
functions in function of sumarized  players altruism and co-player reputation.  
 
Motivation and Implementation.  
Properties of cooperation’s probability function in Prisoner Dilemma 
have impact on evolution of game. Authors of [2] assumed, that F was a 
linear function of both: the player’s altruism in range (-0.5, 0.5) and the co-
player’s reputation in range (0, 1). Accordingly, the range of values of in 
range F within (-0.5, 1.5) was limited to (0,1) as follows: the result above 1 
was set to 1 and the result below 0 was set to 0. If agents play in pairs, both 
could choose both dominating strategy in almost all cases [3, 8]. Here, I 
propose a modification of this probability function to a smooth one 
(hyperbolic tangent with scaling parameter a, which corresponds to shape of 
curve) and observe three phases for different range of a [Fig. 1]. 
 Here, for neutral altruism (the altruism -   of all agents is set to zero) 
the probability P(i,j) that agent i cooperates with agent j is assumed as: 
(1=),( axF tanh 1/2)))/2(( jWa  where 1<<0 jW  is the reputation of 
agent i in eyes of k and altruism is neutral. Parameter 1/a can be understand 
as a human noise [9]. The main observable of our dynamica system is mean 
reputation of our pair of players W = ( ij WW  )/2. I examime its time 
evolution for a single pair and collective statistcs for all possible 
configuration of initial conditions. 
Note that in the limit of infinite a, P is stepwised and game results are 
are fully determinated by initial contidtions. The most important scenario 
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shows up for initial condition W~1/2, because the is no common 
strategy between palyers. I observe three phases for different range of a, 
which could explain different non-deterministic social behaviors [Fig. 
2]. Boundaries between phases are smooth and some properties overlap. 
 
 Fig.  2. STD of reputation in population with characteristic lines 
for comparable distributions and 3 distingished phases 
 
Discussed competing strategies (called ‘strange strategy’) for 
W~1/2 for finite a are not stable and their lifetime is also invetsigated 
[Fig. 2, 3]. For infinite a, the game has three possible outcomes: a) both 
cooperate (probability 0.25), b) both defect (probability 0.25) and c) a 
cyclic series of games where either j cooperates and i defects, or the 
opposite, exchanging the strategies at each time step – ‘strange 
strategy’. Then, the distribution of W from initial conditions consists of 
three pheses at {0, ½, 1} [Fig. 3]. Small perturbations within the phase 
boarder will self-correct back to these fixed points. Concluding, these 
fixed points are stable and are also attractors of this system.  However, 
its is not as simply in finite a case. In this paper, I rised some questions 
as:  What is the resulting equilibrium state?  How many regimes a form? 
What is the composition of each phase in various regimes? 
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Fig. 3 Part of phase diagram for deterministic (very large) range of a in 
function of initial condition (reputation of both players) . We observe 3 pure 
phases W=1 (always cooperate), W=0 (always defect) and in the middle 
W=1/2 (once defect once cooperate – ‘strange strategy’) . 
 
Results – Phases.  
I examine the model of cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with a 
new (smooth) activation function containing a scalling parameter a. As the 
result I distinguished three scenarios of behavior depending on different 
values of a. Starting with with 0=a  (activation function is constant and does 
not depent on any variables), first weak correlated very noisy regime (1) is 
reached. As regime (1) crossover (2) rather rapidly around 5=a  with sharp 
bound. Regime (2) goes into (3) very slowly and transition is somewhere 
above 25=a , where system become deterministic.  
   
 
Fig.  4. Fits of decay function with intensity of the middle peak for 
selected characteristic a 
    
There are three modes of behavior (termed phases for brevity from now 
on) for different ranges of a. However, the boundaries between these phases 
are fuzzy: some properties overlap. 
(Regime 1) - For a< 5, strategies seem to randomly changing in time 
like generalized mean-reverting quasi-geometric Brownian motion with 
atractive boundaries [Fig. 5]. Apart from a noisy base, atraction to mean and 
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boundaries is noticed. However, autocorrelation (memory) is growing 
with a.     
 
Fig.  5. Regime 1. For small a reputations evolve quite randomly 
 
 (Crossover Regime 1&2) - For a around 5, players choose in most 
cases the common strategy (both cooperate or both defect) and play this 
for some time. A state can switch to the opposite one with some 
probability, as shown in [Fig. 6].  
 
Fig.  6. Crossover Regime 1&2. Characteristic depolarisation 
   
(Regime 2) - For 25<<5 a  the common strategies dominate. 
During a few initial steps of the simulation usually the players quickly 
choose some common strategy. Still, some ’strange’ strategy is also 
possible, where mean reputation of both players is around 0.5, i.e. close 
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to the center of the range [Fig. 8 left]. This means that when one of players 
cooperates, the other defects; in the next step the roles are exchanged, and so 
on. Yet after some time, only the common strategies survive. The 
disappearance of the ‘strange‘ peak of mean reputation can be described as 
exponential decay exp(-t/ ) [Fig. 4, 7, 9]. The strange oscillating scenario 
cannot persist because the system is not fully deterministic. Namely, it is 
always possible that the cycle is broken by an error: an agent selects a 
strategy despite its small probability. In a consequence, one of two common 
strategies prevails. The best fit of the exponential decrease of the strange 
behavior is around 10=a  [Fig. 9]. In general, the intensity of the ‘strange‘ 
peak does not decrease to zero for smaller a, because the probability of 
switching back to the strange state remains positive. On the other hand for 
larger a the relaxation time is very large. 
 
Fig.  7. Histograms of mean reputation of 1000 pairs in consecutive time 
steps for a=8 
   
(Regime 3) - For a > 25 the spectrum of strategies does not vary in time. 
I observe pairs of agents who play the common strategy: both cooperate or 
both defect. This happens for a half of the simulated population (0.25+0.25). 
For the remaining half of population, the mean reputation is 0.5 [Fig. 2], what 
reflects the oscillating of strategies. The probability of this ‘strange‘ strategy 
does not decrease in time and it coexists with the common strategies [Fig. 8 
right]. Asymptotically, for infinite a, the probability function P turns into the 
stepwise one and the system is no stochastic any more. In this situation, the 
time evolution can be predicted from the initial state. In particular, the 
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‘strange‘ strategy is a consequence of the initial state where one player 
has reputation above 0.5, and the other below 0.5. In each step, one 
player loses his reputation but another gains, in the next step the 
opposite and so on.        
 
Fig.  8. Regime 2 (left), Phase 3 (right). Cycles around mean 
W=0.5  
 
 
Fig.  9. Estimation of decay constant   representing ‘strange‘ 
strategy - phase 2 (left), estimation error of   which has minimum 
around a=10 (right) 
 
Conclusions & Speculations.  
A simple model from game theory, which can imitate a decision 
making patterns, is proposed.  I explore the model of cooperation in the 
Prisoner‘s Dilemma, based on reputation [2]. Investigated probability 
),( jiP  that agent i cooperates with agent j is assumed as 
{1=),,( ajiP tanh 1/2)]}/2([ jWa , where 1/a is a measure of errors 
of the players (uncertainty of the game). In the limit of infinite a, the 
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game is deterministic with possible outcomes: a) both cooperate (W=1), b) 
both defect (W=0) and c) and strange strategy’ (W=1/2). For finite values of 
a, the probability of c) decreases exponentially in time. For small values of a, 
a crossover is observed from the state where only options a) and b) appear 
(a=5) to a homogeneous distribution of W at the most fuzzy case a=0.  
In this paper, only neutral altruism case was analysed, but other possible 
values of   are just linear shift in the argument of function )(xF . The 
system is equivalent to pair of nodes with a single link between agents. Such a 
simplest possible interactive system is necessary to understand basic 
properties of activation function. Others configuration: triangle and networks 
(fully connected graph, lattices, E-R, B-A, small world or real social 
networks) were tested for a base model [8]. In literature smooth function of 
opinion is also described as a Fermi function [10, 11], but I choose tanh due 
to known and simple mathematical properties. a1/  understood as an ‘human 
error‘ is responsible for spontaneous changes of individual decision and lead 
to synchronized change of global strategy [9]. It reflects the dynamicity of 
real social system better than standard equilibrium approach. Proposed 
function characterizes different phases, which can be applied to social 
phenomena: 
- In phase 1 process of decision making is very sensitive to condition 
and people are not consistent in their strategies. No consensus, but also no 
conflicts are possible in long terms (e.g. children games [12]).  
- In crossover 1&2 phases people act in schisophemic way (once are 
very consequent in one strategy, to change it rapidly to second one (e.g. Dr. 
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde).  
- In phase 2 one strategy dominate for long time, but very important 
issue could change it (e.g. Nazism in Germany [13]).  
Concluding, dominat startegy in game can change over time according 
to a set of fixed rules and presente parameter a determines how one state of 
the system moves to another state. 
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IN RUSSIAN  
Ярыновский, А. Молдавский Государственный Университет в Кишиневе 
КАКАЯ ФУНКЦИЯ АКТИВАЦИИ СОТРУДНЕЧЕСТВА ОПИСЫВАЕТ 
ЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСКОЕ ПОВЕДЕНИЕ? 
Свойства функции вероятности сотрудничества в дилемме заключённого 
оказывают влияние на эволюцию игры. Базовая модель определяет, что 
вероятность сотрудничества линейно зависит как от альтруизма игрока так 
и от репутации остальных игроков. Предлагаю измененить функции 
активации на гладкую функцию (гиперболический тангенс с параметром 
масштабирования а, который соответствует его форме) и наблюдать три 
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фазы  различного диапазона а: 
(1) Для малых а, стратегии случайно изменяются во времени и ситуация 
смешанных вариантов (один сотрудничества и второй дефект) преобладает; 
(2) Для средних а, игроки выбирают только одну стратегию для 
определенного периода времени (общее положение может перейти на 
противоположную с некоторой вероятностью); 
(3) Для больших а, смешанная стратегия (один раз дефект, один раз 
сотрудничество) сосуществует с общими стратегиями и изменения не 
допускаются. 
Я считаю, что предложенная функция лучше характеризует социально-
экономические явления и особенно фаза 1 и 2 включают в себя большую часть 
поведения человека. 
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